INTRODUCTION
Our system of intellectual property (IP) law effectively stimulates the creation and distribution of information and information-rich products that are vital to economic growth and well-being. Unfortunately, the system also promotes harmful rent-seeking by owners of IP rights who undertake opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits. Some IP owners value their property right chiefly as a "ticket" into court that gives them a credible threat to sue vulnerable IP users.
1 Socially harmful IP litigation is common because the rights are easy to get and potentially apply quite broadly, and the problem is growing worse because of the expansion of the scope and strength of IP law. 2 This Article addresses rent-seeking that arises when a party seeks to enforce an IP right that is probably invalid or seeks to stretch a valid right to cover activities outside the proper scope of the right. Such rent-seeking costs can be controlled by (1) reducing the risk that parties will acquire invalid IP rights, (2) making the scope of rights clearer, and (3) using a mix of procedural and substantive measures that mitigate the harm caused by lawsuits based on vague or invalid rights. 250-51 (1985) ("the social costs of rent-seeking protectionism can be very high"). 4 Id. at 252-53 (treble damages encourage rent-seeking though they also play a desirable deterrent role). 5 For example, Chrysler challenged a GM-Toyota joint venture. Chrysler's incentives were exactly the opposite of the social welfare goals -Chrysler would oppose a joint venture that created socially desirable productive efficiency for GM and Toyota because that would hurt Chrysler, and Chrysler would favor a joint venture that caused a socially harmful output restriction because that would help Chrysler. Id. at 256-57. 6 Whether these responses were good policy is open to debate. Measures that control rent-seeking litigation sometimes discourage too much socially desirable litigation. 7 Antitrust injury doctrine. Brunswick. Cargill.
limited role for antitrust judgments against anti-competitive plaintiffs. Part IV identifies certain IP rights that should be trimmed through a reduction in scope and strength. The most encouraging developments on this front are the Supreme Court's efforts to restrict trade dress protection, and the Federal Circuit's efforts to restrict the scope and increase the clarity of patent claims. Contraction of certain IP rights is a desirable complement to ex post control measures that are never completely effective.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNISTIC AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWSUITS A. Weak Lawsuits and Credible Threats
A lawsuit is weak if the objective probability of successfully proving infringement is low at the time of filing. The probability of success is evaluated using the knowledge of a hypothetical plaintiff who files after conducting a reasonable investigation. 11 The probability of success may be low because the right asserted likely does not cover the defendant's behavior or because the right is unlikely to be valid. A weak lawsuit is anti-competitive 12 if the defendant's alleged infringing behavior occurs in a market the plaintiff participates in or intends to enter; otherwise a weak lawsuit is opportunistic. 8 See cite; cf. Baumol & Ordover, supra note 4, at 254. 9 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88, 597 (1986) . 10 See Merges, supra note 3, at 2190-91 ("There is a fine line … between a meritorious property right and an odious government enforced rent.") 11 Compare Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 519, 533 (1997); (A lawsuit is frivolous "(1) when a plaintiff files knowing facts that establish complete (or virtually complete) absence of merit as an objective matter on the legal theories alleged, or (2) when a plaintiff files without conducting a reasonable investigation which, if conducted, would place the lawsuit in prong (1).") 12 One might consider every intellectual property lawsuit against a competitor to be anti-competitive because exclusionary remedies are available to successful plaintiffs. That would be simplistic because it ignores the incentive effect produced by the profit derived from the exclusionary power of intellectual property. Nevertheless, the label anti-competitive might be appropriate when applied to strong claims that are derived from an underlying intellectual property law that is overly protective. Regardless of the appropriate label, those issues are outside the scope of this Article.
A plaintiff usually files an anti-competitive lawsuit seeking to impair the defendant's performance in their shared market or even to exclude the defendant from the market completely; 13 a plaintiff files an opportunistic lawsuit seeking a settlement payment. 14 Opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits are initially puzzling because it is hard to see why defendants would yield to the threat of weak suit. The puzzle can be solved by explaining why a defendant rationally believes a plaintiff with a weak lawsuit would actually prosecute the lawsuit through trial. There are three main reasons weak IP lawsuits are credible.
15
First, the scope of IP rights is highly variable. Reasonable judges often disagree on the interpretation of a patent claim. The standard for trademark infringement, likelihood of consumer confusion, is inherently noisy. Copyright law asks the fact-finder 13 This Article does not address the problem of intellectual property licenses designed to cartelize a market. One goal of this Article is to understand how to control anti-competitive litigation by structuring the law to reduce the credibility of weak intellectual property lawsuits. Licenses that facilitate cartels do not depend on the credibility of the threat to sue; strong, weak, or sham rights can all be used to disguise collusion. Therefore, the control measures discussed in this Article are not targeted at the problem of collusion. 14 Lawyers and economists have devoted significant attention to the problem of opportunistic lawsuits; they have developed a variety of theories to explain such suits, and a variety of policy recommendations to control them. Cir. 1981 ) (expert testing required before filing a patent infringement lawsuit in a case involving a sophisticated technology). A relatively uninformed plaintiff can credibly prosecute a weak lawsuit until litigation has moved far enough along that the defendant has a chance to show that given the broadest plausible scope of the plaintiff's IP right, the defendant's action fall outside that scope.
to make a difficult subjective decision whether the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's expressive work. Besides vague standards for infringement, trials often feature conflicting expert testimony about matters relevant to the scope of an IP right.
Compounding these problems is the risk of error by judges and juries. Trial errors are difficult to dispel in IP litigation, 16 because the complexity of the evidence can make it difficult for a deserving defendant to win a summary judgment or even prevail at trial.
17
High variance in the scope of rights makes it profitable for IP plaintiffs with apparently narrow rights to gamble the court will grant them broad rights. A common strategy used in opportunistic e-commerce lawsuits is to dust off a pre-Internet patent and argue the patent claims extend to cover the Internet.
18
16 A weak lawsuit is credible if the court is likely to err in favor of the plaintiff. Even though the defendant recognizes that she should win at trial, if the risk of error is high enough, then the plaintiff holds a credible threat. Risk of trial error is not a plausible explanation of weak lawsuits in some areas of the law, because a defendant likely could win a summary judgment and defeat the lawsuit at an early stage of litigation at a relatively low cost. See Bone, supra note 12, at 534-37 (nuisance suits based on trial error are uncommon). For example, if a tort defendant has proof that an opportunistic plaintiff was injured by some cause unrelated to the defendant, then the lawsuit is not credible because it would be easy to share that evidence with a court. 17 44 Id. at 628-29. S Industries "actions here look to be part of a pattern of abusive and improper litigation with which the company and Lee Stoller, its sole shareholder, have burdened the courts of this circuit..." Id. 45 Id. at 627. 46 Id. at 627. 47 Id., at 627. "During 4 years of litigation… S Industries failed to produce evidence of a single sale of 'Sentra' brand computer software or hardware." Id.
Opportunistic copyright suits typically pit a minor author against a later successful author. 48 The plaintiff claims the defendant copied from his earlier work.
Some enterprising plaintiffs strengthen the claim of copying by distributing their works to potential defendants; then they can claim the defendant had access. 49 Opportunistic copyright claims are also likely when both the plaintiff and the defendant base their work on something in the public domain. 50 The chutzpah award in this field goes to Ashleigh
Brilliant who coined 7500 aphorisms, and mounted more than a hundred successful copyright infringement suits.
51
Opportunistic IP suits impose direct and indirect costs on defendants and society. 51 See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 9. A plaintiff is more likely to succeed by bringing a sequence of frivolous suits like those brought by E-Data, S Industries, and Brilliant than by bringing an isolated suit. The plaintiff can develop a reputation for imposing costs on defendants even if that also means costs to the plaintiff. The reputation for being tough makes the frivolous claim more credible and more valuable. See Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 Theory & Decision 127 (1978), and subsequent work by economists on reputation. 52 Transfer payments are usually not a source of social loss. Settlement payments to end frivolous lawsuits only cause a social loss to the extent that they distort the decision of firm to enter a market protected by intellectual property rights because of the fear of litigation. First, intellectual property has become more valuable, 57 and the number of patents, copyrights and trademarks has increased rapidly. 58 The rate of IP litigation has grown comparably fast. 59 Opportunistic suits are likely to increase as legitimate suits increase because it is easier to "hide" an opportunistic lawsuit and bluff your way to a settlement payment. Second, a growing market for the sale of IP rights makes it easier to "enter the to preserve its dominant position by suing an entrant for patent infringement. Ethicon knew the patent was invalid because there was a previous inventor and because of public use litigation as a tool for suppressing competition in its antitrust sense, it becomes a matter of antitrust concern." 68 Grip-Pak, x F.3d at x ("many claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on for their own sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning, would be too low to repay the investment in litigation."); see also The goal of the trade dress suit was "to intimidate, discourage and financially damage an upstart competitor." The plaintiff's claims were objectively unreasonable and the plaintiff was motivated by "a desire to financially damage a competitor by forcing it into costly litigation." The court emphasized that the plaintiff was the industry leader and the defendant was a much smaller competitor, and that the plaintiff made no attempt to settle.). For a non-IP example see Alexander v. National Farmers Organization, 687 F.2d 1173 (xth Cir. 19xx) (two dairy producers engaged in a pattern of abusive litigation against a small competitor, defendants considered sponsoring third party litigation in order to increase costs on plaintiff.). 80 Established firms frequently sue departing employees alleging that the start-up benefited from misappropriated trade secrets. "Indeed, the circumstances of trade secret cases and the uncertainty of trade secret law create incentives for frivolous litigation designed to harass competitors rather than to obtain relief for trade secret misappropriation. For example, a company might sue ex-employees who leave to start a competing firm in order to hinder their ability to raise capital during the start-up phase. Frivolous suits of this sort not only add to litigation costs, they also chill competition." Bone, supra note 5, at 279. Intel by purchasing a patent from a bankrupt firm that potentially covered Intel chips.
93
Another microelectronics firm was rescued from financial distress (caused by a patent infringement suit) through a friendly takeover by a white knight. 94 Generally, such countermeasures are not available because transaction costs, private information and freerider problems discourage the formation of coalitions that might battle the predator.
II. PRE-TRIAL CONTROL OF SOCIALLY HARMFUL IP LITIGATION A. Preliminary Injunctions
Despite the restrictive standard for granting preliminary injunctions 96 they are common in patent and copyright cases. 97 To get a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must predator, and why financial distress may be an effective weapon. Brodley, et al., supra note 26, at 2285-2290. 93 See Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, supra note 58, at 62. 94 Id. at 63. 95 Brodley, et al., supra note 26, at 2322-23. Reorganization in bankruptcy or transfer of the prey's assets to another firm are not likely to be successful countermeasures to predation. Id. at 2289-90. The possibility that a successor firm will acquire the prey's assets does not deter predatory pricing because: (1) in some cases the prey's assets are too small to achieve efficient operating scale; (2) the successor will lag far behind in gaining market share in a network industry; (3) fungible assets will sell at the market price not a discount; (4) customers may be shy to leave the predator; (5) the predator may obtain the prey's assets; and (6) successor firms are apt to fear the predator. Id. at 2326-27. 96 Defendants have some measure of control through suits based on malicious prosecution against plaintiffs who obtain preliminary injunctions in bad faith. See WRIGHT, ET 119 Forum choice may reduce the credibility of weak lawsuit, because empirical evidence shows that the choice of forum has a significant impact on trial outcome.
C. Summary Judgment for the Defendant
The law of summary judgment and substantive IP law interact in ways that can promote or discourage socially harmful IP litigation. 121 Summary judgment for the defendant is difficult to achieve when the substantive law sets standards for IP protection that are easy for a plaintiff to meet, or standards that call for careful balancing of context sensitive criteria. For example, the standard for trademark infringement asks whether the defendant's behavior creates a likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers. Courts have identified as many as nine factors that must be evaluated to determine confusion.
122
With so many factors that must be balanced, it is easy for a plaintiff to present a case that gets past summary judgment. 123 A further difficulty is that summary judgment on a fact intensive question may be delayed until time-consuming and expensive discovery is completed. Avoidance of socially harmful litigation requires quick and cheap summary offered to share the costs of the litigation with Kaiser-Permanente as Kaiser attempts to invalidate a gene patent); Frazier, supra note 43 (A small Web-based merchant has organized similar merchants to fight a patent lawsuit he sees as an "extortion scam." He set up a web site for defendantswww.youmaybenext.com -to organize the fight against the patent owner.) 118 Acceptance of licenses is a secondary consideration pointing toward nonobviousness and validity of a patent. 119 The choice of forum is fairly restricted by venue considerations, and so there might not be a venue offering the option of a relatively speedy trial. 120 Choice of forum might also allow the alleged infringer to get an early trial date. 121 See generally, Bone, supra note 12, at 520-22 (describing summary judgment and other procedural reforms motivated by worries about frivolous suits); Samuel Yankee also claimed infringement of copyright on the labels of nine scented candles. 135 The court granted summary judgment for the defendant after applying the merger doctrine because no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity. 136 The
Yankee Candle decision is representative of the greater receptiveness courts now show to 128 The Supreme Court considered a more fact-intensive standard of distinctiveness and rejected it because: "Such a test would rarely provide the basis for summary disposition of an anti-competitive strike suit. When the court must balance factors like access and similarity it is hard for a defendant to win summary judgment even though she knows she created the work independently.
140
In Arnstein v. Porter the plaintiff Arnstein claimed that various musical compositions were copied by the defendant Cole Porter. One song sold over a million copies, but the second sold only about 2000 copies, and the third was not published but had been performed over the radio. The plaintiff also claimed that someone stole a copy of the compositions from his room. The trial court decided for the defendant on summary judgment. The Second Circuit reversed. The court found enough similarity and access to raise a factual question. The court emphasized that issues of credibility created by the plaintiff's allegations must be evaluated by the jury.
141
Defendants cannot be certain to escape trial and ultimate liability even when they have documented their independent creation. Proof of widespread dissemination coupled with a theory of subconconscious copying is enough to win a music copyright infringement claim. 142 Defendants are vulnerable to copyright infringement suits even though their connection to the plaintiff is tenuous and their access to the plaintiff's work is entirely conjectural. model. The plastic version had small differences from the original. 145 Since the 140 See supra note 119. 141 The court also noted that a jury could possibly also find an unlawful appropriation because the similarities between the compositions were not merely trifling. The dissent approved of summary judgment because the works lacked appreciable similarity. 145 Many of the differences were not perceptible to the casual observer, and the work took less than two days. A smaller base and was 2 inches shorter, the umbrella was pressed against his leg (to allow a one-differences were dictated by functional considerations or did not amount to significant alterations the originality requirement was not satisfied. 146 In the field of patent law, the Federal Circuit has pushed two doctrinal positions that make summary judgment easier for defendants. First, the court characterized patent claim construction as a question of law, and encouraged pre-trial hearings called Markman hearings to construe the scope of patent claims. 147 Defendants have an opportunity to win a summary judgment of noninfringement if they succeed in persuading the court to adopt a narrow claim construction. 148 Second, the court has reduced the role of the doctrine of equivalents. 149 Even though it has an equitable origin, the doctrine of equivalents allows a fact-finder to expand the literal scope of a patent claim to encompass accused processes and devices that depart from the claimed invention by making small changes from the claimed invention. In Festo, the Federal Circuit fashioned an absolute bar against use of the doctrine of equivalents to expand claim limitations that were the subject of narrowing amendments during prosecution history.
That decision pleased big patent owners like IBM who filed an amicus brief asking the Supreme Court to uphold the Federal Circuit decision. The industry amici believed that restricting the scope of the doctrine of equivalents would help control opportunistic piece mold for easier manufacturing), the eagle clutches leaves instead of arrows, the shape and texture of the hat, and the shape of the carpet bag was changed. 146 169 The other theory applies to sham litigation, including sham IP litigation, 170 and is based on a
showing that the antitrust defendant (IP plaintiff) knew that objectively there was no basis for the infringement claim. 171 Under either theory, the antitrust plaintiff must prove it suffered an antitrust injury, and must also show that the IP litigation created or sustained a monopoly in the relevant market.
172
Trebled antitrust damages are a potent deterrent of anti-competitive activity, but in practice, antitrust does little to control socially harmful IP litigation because its reach is very limited; it does not apply to opportunistic litigation and applies to only a subset of anti-competitive litigation. Antitrust law does not reach opportunistic litigation because the purpose of such litigation is to extract a settlement payment not to exclude a rival. In antitrust parlance, there is no antitrust injury and no attempt to monopolize a market. The sham litigation theory applies to lawsuits that have an anti-competitive effect because of the cost and delay created by the litigation; it does not apply to lawsuits that have an anticompetitive effect because a plaintiff succeeds in enforcing a weak IP right. 173 The
Walker Process theory has limited utility because it is difficult to prove fraudulent patent procurement. 174 Where Section Two applies, it probably deters the most egregious lawsuits in which a monopolist gets a flimsy patent and litigates an entrant out of existence, but it does not have much effect otherwise. Section Two claims based on sham litigation are very common, 175 but almost never successful.
IV. SCREENING OUT WEAK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWSUITS A. Better Examination at the Patent and Trademark Office
Better screening of putative IP rights at an early stage would certainly help mitigate the problems of opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits, but there is little hope for this method of control. Copyright and trade secret rights are not subjected to any examination; copyright has a minimal registration procedure. Thus, there is no opportunity to use agency resources to screen out weak copyright and trade secret claims.
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examines patents and trademarks, and could do a better job of screening out weak claims, but various factors limit the performance of the agency. 177 A fundamental limitation on trademark examination is that plaintiffs can protect unregistered marks under federal law.
178
The ex parte nature of examination restricts the information available to examiners and poses the chief obstacle to high quality examination at the PTO. 179 Patent applicants and their attorneys have a duty to disclose information relevant to patentability. A patent owner risks facing a defense of inequitable conduct which leaves a patent unenforceable if he or she was not candid with the PTO. Despite these incentives, critics charge that many patents are granted that would not have been granted if the PTO had better information. 180 Examination suffers from three other problems. First, examiners have a financial incentive to process applications quickly. 181 The patent prosecution process moves so quickly that the average patent gets only 18 hours of review. 182 Second, opening new fields to patentable subject matter has resulted in low patent quality because the prior art needed to examine an application is not available, and third, finding trained examiners in a new field is difficult. These problems are acute in the fields of software and business methods. 183 Some of these problems could be cured by increasing the resources available to the PTO, 184 but there is a strong argument to limit the resources spent on examination:
most patents and many registered trademarks have little or no value, therefore, a thorough examination of every application would be wasteful. There is also database protection, dilution, blurring, cybersquatting, and misappropriation. A strange aspect to many of these expansions is that they occur without any specific thought given to the need for protection."
